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I. INTRODUCTION

The discovery of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) created a new dilemma for
healthcare providers faced with the challenge of knowing that their patients
may be putting others at risk of an incredibly serious, and usually fatal,
disease.' State legislatures responded to this dilemma and the immense
1. See Basic Information About HIV and AIDS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm (last updated Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter
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public fear of AIDS by enacting statutes that allowed, or even required,
notification of sexual and needle-sharing partners of their potential
exposure to HIV when a patient refuses to notify them on his or her own.2
Despite the importance of preventing the spread of HIV, the need for
personal privacy protections imposes limitations on these state partnernotification laws. According to certain circuit courts of appeals, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers medical information
in its ambit of personal privacy protections.'
This Comment argues that partner-notification statutes, in their most
common forms, may be unconstitutional as applied to HIV-positive people
who regularly comply with their medication and maintain an undetectable
viral load, and, by extension, a low level of infectiousness. 5 Part II of this
Comment describes the development of the HIV epidemic, as well as the
legislative response to it.' Part II also discusses the different cases that
form the basis for a constitutional right to privacy in personal medical
information, with a focus on United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.7
Part III then applies the seven-factor test developed in Westinghouse to
Michigan's and Maryland's partner-notification statutes through the lens of
a hypothetical situation.8 Based on this analysis, Part IV recommends that
partner-notification statutes be amended to take infectiousness into account
before triggering any notification requirement so that the statutes are
narrowly tailored to the purpose of preventing the spread of HIV. 9 Lastly,
Basic Information] (describing routes of HIV transmission including sexual intercourse
and other transfers of bodily fluids).
2. See Benjamin F. Neidl, The Lesser of Two Evils: New York's HIV/AIDS
PartnerNotification Law and Why the Right ofPrivacy Must Yield to Public Health, 73

L. REv. 1191, 1198 (1999) (detailing common forms of partner-notification
laws enacted to prevent the transmission of HIV, having initially developed in the
1930s for venereal diseases).
3. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (holding that states have latitude
in addressing matters of local concern despite potential infringement upon personal
privacy interests).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cir. 1980) (emphasizing the personal nature of medical records).
5. See EFFECT OF ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY ON RISK OF SEXUAL TRANSMISSION
OF HIV INFECTION AND SUPERINFECTION, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 1 (2009)
ST. JOHN'S

[hereinafter Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy], available at http://www.cdc.gov/

(explaining the correlation
hiv/topics/treatment/resources/factsheets/pdflart.pdf
between viral load and infectiousness).
6. See infra Part II (describing the history of HIV/AIDS and public reaction to the
epidemic).
7. See infra Part II (explaining the circuit split over the constitutional right to
medical privacy and the standards developed by the circuits that recognize it).
8. See infra Part III (analyzing the balance between personal interest in medical
privacy and government interest in public health as expressed by partner-notification
statutes).
9. See infra Part IV (recommending that partner-notification statutes take
infectiousness into account when establishing parameters for involuntary notification).
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Part V concludes that, by taking infectiousness into account, statutes can
better balance the government's public health interest against an HIVpositive person's interest in maintaining his or her medical privacy and,
therefore, better satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.'o
II. BACKGROUND

A. History of the HIVEpidemic
1. Discoveringand UnderstandingTransmission
HIV is a virus that, when it infects the human body, destroys CD4+ T
cells, blood cells that are vital to defending the body against disease."
Doctors first isolated HIV in 1984 in an effort to discover the cause of
AIDS.1 2 AIDS, a usually fatal condition that weakens the immune system,
came to the attention of the medical community in 1981, when most
reported cases occurred among homosexuals and intravenous drug users.' 3
The prevalence of the disease in these particular communities and a general
lack of knowledge regarding the transfer of HIV/AIDS stigmatized HIV
infection and marginalized those affected by it. 14
As early as 1983, the transmission of AIDS was linked to intimate sexual
contact and exposure to infected blood.' 5 By 1986, the major routes of
transmission were identified: (1) sexual contact, (2) exposure to used
needles or infected blood, and (3) passage of the virus from infected
mothers to their newborns.16 Because these routes encompass a broad
range of behaviors and activities, HIV prevention efforts have varied
10. See infra Part V (concluding that statutes failing to take infectiousness into
account do not satisfy constitutional requirements when applied to persons with
undetectable viral loads).
11. See Basic Information, supra note 1 (describing the effects of HIV infection on
the immune system).
12. See History of AIDS Up to 1986, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/aids-history86.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2012) (discussing the study by the Centers for Disease
Control that isolated the virus that causes AIDS).

13. See id. (recounting the increased incidence of rare diseases such as Kaposi's
Sarcoma and Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia amongst patients later discovered to
have AIDS).
14. See ETHEL KLEIN, GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, U.S. PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD
HIV/AIDS: PERCEPTIONS OF RISK, BIAS, AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING 8-9 (Apr. 2,
available at http://www.gmhc.org/files/editor/file/perceptions klein3.pdf
2009),

(finding that many Americans believe that those infected by HIV face discrimination).

15. See Current Trends Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) UpdateUnited States, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (June 24, 1983), at 24

(identifying intravenous drug users and men who have sex with men as groups at
highest risk for HIV infection).
16. See Thomas C. Quinn et al., AIDS in Africa: An Epidemiologic Paradigm, 21
SCIENCE 955, 958 (1986) (describing documented HIV transmission routes).
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widely.17 Of primary concern in this Comment are legislative efforts to
prevent transmission through sexual contact by allowing involuntary
partner notification.
2. The Evolution of Treatment

The treatment of HIV has evolved dramatically since its discovery. 9 At
the outset of the epidemic, an HIV diagnosis was considered a death
sentence due to the likely onset of AIDS shortly thereafter.20 The
development of protease inhibitors in 1995 revolutionized the treatment of
HIV. 2 1 Between 1996 and 2005, the average life expectancy of an HIVpositive person in the United States increased from 10.5 years to 22.5 years
after initial infection.22
Doctors look to two main markers when monitoring the health of an
HIV-positive patient. The first is a patient's viral load, which is the
concentration of the virus in a person's bloodstream.2 3 The viral load
shows the extent of the infection, and the patient's health is better when
this number is lower.24 The second is the patient's CD4 count, the measure
of the number of CD4+ T cells in a patient's blood. 25 The CD4 count
17. See, e.g., What Can States Do to Achieve Safe Community Needle Disposal?,

http://www.cdc.gov/needledisposal/goals.htm (last
updated Sept. 26, 2011) (discussing strategies for safe needle disposal to prevent bloodborne infections); Condom Distribution as a Structural Level Intervention, CENTERS
CONTROL,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/
FOR
DISEASE
condom distribution.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2010) (advocating condom distribution
as a strategy to prevent the spread of HIV through sexual contact).
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,

18. Christine E. Stenger, Note, Taking Tarasoff Where No One Has Gone Before:

Looking at "Duty to Warn" Under the AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 471,
471 (1996) (describing statutes requiring physicians to inform third parties of the
potential risk of the transmission of HIV, despite the obligation of doctor-patient
confidentiality).
19. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 1 (detailing the marked
advances in antiretroviral therapy medications which have greatly reduced the spread
of the HIV virus within the past decade).
20. See Neidl, supra note 2, at 1196-97 (describing the relative untreatability of
HIV/AIDS).
21. See

History of AIDS:

1993-1997,

AVERT,

http://www.avert.org/aids-

history93-97.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (noting the promise of saquinavir and
similar classes of drugs and their ability to treat HIV).
22. See Kathleen McDavid Harrison et al., Life Expectancy After HIV Diagnosis

Based on National HIV Surveillance Data from 25 States, United States, 53 J.
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 124, 125 (2009) (documenting the increase
in life expectancy for HIV-positive persons treated with antiretroviral therapy, from
10.5 years to 22.5 years, between 1996 and 2005).
23. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 1 (defining viral load as

"levels of virus in the bloodstream").
24. See id. (explaining that antiretroviral therapy is considered effective when it
suppresses viral load).
25. See Basic Information, supra note 1 (stating that HIV targets and destroys
CD4+ T cells).
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shows the extent to which HIV infection has damaged the patient's immune
system, and the patient is in better health when this number is higher.26
Currently, with regular adherence to protease inhibitors, a class of drugs
that prevents the replication of viruses, and other antiretroviral medications,
an HIV-positive person's viral load may be undetectable.2 7 In addition to
the benefits to the individual patient's health, an undetectable viral load
now has also been linked to a lower rate of transmission through sexual
contact.28
B. Development ofPartner-NotificationLaws
1. Medical Privacy and Threats to Third Parties
An individual's health issues may, in certain cases, create a risk to the
health of third parties. An overall goal of public health policy is to manage
these risks, whether it is through preventing the spread of disease or
through other kinds of interventions. 2 9 However, public health policy may
not easily address certain more acute risks through these broader efforts,
and may require specific action by individual health care providers in the
form of partner-notification.30
Since Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the legal role
of doctors has evolved with regard to their duty to protect third parties
affected by the health issues of their patients.31 In Tarasoff the Supreme
Court of California imposed a duty upon therapists to warn third parties
when a patient is reasonably believed to be a threat.32 Other courts have
26. See id (noting CD4+ T cells are vital to the immune system and that allowing
degradation of those cells will lead to poor health).
27. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 1 (specifying an
undetectable viral load as an indicator of effective antiretroviral treatment); Classes of
HIVIAIDS Antiretroviral Drugs, NAT'L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES,

http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/HIVAIDS/Understanding/Treatment/Pages/arvDrugCl
asses.aspx (last updated Mar. 26, 2009) (outlining the function of different
antiretroviral drugs).
28. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 3 (observing that

undetectable viral load should reduce the risk of infecting a partner).
29. See,

e.g.,

What

Is

Public

Health,

OHIo

DEP'T

HEALTH,

http://www.odh.ohio.gov/landing/about odh/whatispublichealth.aspx (last updated July
19, 2011) (stating that public health is the actions society takes, collectively, to assure
healthy conditions).
30. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that HIV-

positive people with asymptomatic infection pose the greatest risk of transmission).
31. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (noting
that previous cases have relied on either a special relationship or a judgment on
whether the defendant created a threat to a third party through lack of ordinary care or
skill in order to find a duty to warn a third party); see also Stenger, supra note 18, at
471 (arguing that Tarasofffundamentally changed the doctor-patient relationship).
32. See Tarasoff 551 P.2d at 343 (finding a special relationship between the
defendant, a therapist, and the patient who had informed said therapist of an intent to
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since extended this duty to cover infectious diseases such as hepatitis and
spinal meningitis. 33
2. HIV-Specific Legislation

Initially, in their legislation governing the treatment of HIV, some states
adopted the Supreme Court of California's approach to warning third
parties.34 Due to the acute danger posed by HIV infection in the early
1990s, legislators were able to analogize the homicidal patient of Tarasoff
to an HIV-positive patient who knowingly engaged in unprotected sex.35
Few states still impose an affirmative duty on health care providers to
warn the sexual partners of an HIV-positive patient of their potential
exposure to the virus.36 More commonly, statutes instead create guidelines
for when notification is permissible and specifically limit liability for those
health care providers who act in good faith.37 Typically, when a doctor
knows the identity of the sexual partner of an HIV-positive patient and that
the patient has refused to notify that partner of the risk of transmission
despite counseling, notifying the partner without the patient's permission is
not a breach of doctor-patient confidentiality.38 While all statutes specify
that doctors shall only provide notification where there is a risk of
transmission, "risk" is not defined in a way that takes into account actual
infectiousness due to viral load.

harm a specific victim).
33. See Stenger, supra note 18, at 487-89 (noting cases that found a duty to warn

third parties of a patient's medical condition).

34. See, e.g., Neidl, supra note 2, at 1212-15 (describing a New York statute
imposing an affirmative duty on public health officials to notify individuals of potential
exposure to HIV).
35. See Stenger, supra note 18, at 494 (arguing that the fear of innocent third
parties to contract HIV led to legislation allowing for the disclosure of a patient's HIV
status).
36. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5131 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)
(imposing an affirmative duty on doctors to warn third parties of their exposure to HIV
by one of the doctor's patients), with MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337
(LexisNexis 2009) (precluding liability for doctors acting in good faith in disclosing or
not disclosing patient's HIV status to an exposed third party).
37. Accord ARIz. REV. STAT. § 32-1860 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring a physician
to report the name of an HIV-positive patient's sexual partner to the department of
health services when patient has refused to disclose his or her status); see also HEALTHGEN. § 18-337 (permitting a physician to directly notify the sexual partners of a patient
who has refused to disclose his or her HIV status).
38. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1860(a) (prohibiting doctors from notifying a
patient's spouse or sex partner without first asking the patient to release the information
voluntarily).
39. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.182 (West 2011) (limiting notification to
sexual partners cohabitating with an HIV-positive person for more than one year).
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C. Establishinga Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy in Medical
Information
1. Whalen v. Roe and the CircuitSplit on Medical PrivacyRights
Whalen v. Roe forms the basis for a constitutional right to privacy in
one's medical information. 4 0 At issue was a New York statute requiring
physicians to report a patient's name, address, and age, along with other
information, to the State Health Department each time the physician
prescribed a Schedule II drug. 41 A group of patients and doctors
challenged the law, claiming that it violated the patients' right to privacy.42
In its analysis, the Supreme Court identified two different kinds of privacy
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the "individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and (2) the "interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."43 The
majority of Fourteenth Amendment privacy jurisprudence falls under the
latter category and forms the more common conception of protected
activities.4 4
Several circuits, however, have extended the privacy interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters to find a constitutionally protected right to
privacy in one's medical information. 4 5 According to these courts, any law
permitting or requiring disclosure of an individual's medical information
must be evaluated by balancing the government's interest against the
individual's interest in keeping that information private.46 Though courts
40. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (finding a right to privacy in
certain types of medical records).
41. See id. at 593 (describing the requirement that physicians fill out three copies of
an official form each time they prescribe a Schedule II drug).
42. See id. at 595 (noting that litigants were patients prescribed Schedule II drugs,
prescribing physicians, and two professional physicians' associations).
43. See id. at 599-600 (delineating the primary categories of protected personal
privacy interests).
44. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (invalidating restrictions on the
right to seek an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a woman's privacy interest in the decision to have an
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the privacy interest of married couples using birth
control).
45. See Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding Whalen v.
Roe to be the strongest Supreme Court precedent for a constitutional right to privacy in
medical information); see also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that medical records definitely fall within the ambit of
materials entitled to privacy protection). But see J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090
(6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Constitution does not encompass a right to
nondisclosure of private information).
46. See Romero, 72 F.3d at 522 (noting that the right to medical privacy depends
on a balance between privacy and public health).
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have upheld statutes requiring the reporting of various kinds of public
health information to local and state governments, courts have taken a
stricter view of disclosures to members of the public.47
2. United States v. Westinghouse and the Seven-FactorBalancing Test
The Third Circuit relied on Whalen to evaluate a subpoena by the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for the
medical records belonging to employees of the Westinghouse Electric
Corporation.4 8 Westinghouse refused to honor the subpoena, prompting
NIOSH to seek an enforcement order, which the District Court granted.49
On appeal, Westinghouse argued, in part, that the subpoena infringed upon
its employees' right to privacy.50 Though the Third Circuit affirmed the
District Court's decision, it acknowledged the constitutional protection of
personal medical information, and enumerated seven factors contributing to
permissible infringement upon this protection: (1) the type of record
involved, (2) the information it contains, (3) the potential for harm due to
nonconsensual disclosure, (4) the injury to the relationship that generated
the record caused by disclosure, (5) the presence of a public interest
articulated by statute or policy militating toward access, (6) the degree of
need for access, and (7) the sufficiency of measures to prevent
Courts, both inside and outside the Third
unauthorized disclosures."
Circuit, have since utilized these factors to balance government interests
against individual privacy interests when evaluating government
disclosures of personal medical information. 52

47. See Westinghouse, 638 F.3d at 573, 579-80 (describing the extensive measures

necessary to ensure that medical information is not disseminated to the public).
48. See id at 577-78 (relying on Whalen v. Roe as guiding precedent for medical
privacy cases).
49. See id at 573 (discussing the subpoena for medical records of all employees
that were currently working, or had previously worked, in a certain part of the Trafford,
Pennsylvania plant).
50. See id. at 576 (explaining Westinghouse's argument that the NIOSH subpoena
infringes upon the employees' constitutional right to privacy).
51. See id. at 578 (outlining factors relevant to the weighing of the personal privacy
interest in a particular piece of medical information and the government's interest in its
disclosure).
52. See, e.g., Doe v. New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying
Westinghouse factors to public release of conciliation agreement); Borucki v. Ryan,
827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Westinghouse factors to disclosure of court
ordered psychological evaluation); Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (applying Westinghouse factors to disclosure of presentence report); Doe v.
Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying Westinghouse factors to
disclosure of arrestee's AIDS diagnosis).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

9

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9

490

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:2

D. Creatinga Test Casefor Taking Infectiousness into Account
1. Test Case Hypothetical
Jane Smith is a twenty-five-year-old, heterosexual, HIV-positive woman.
She was diagnosed with HIV five years ago and, likely, had it transmitted
to her by a male sexual partner. She has been on antiretroviral medication
since her diagnosis and has a history of regular compliance with her
medication regimen.53 Her viral load is undetectable, and she has no other
sexually transmitted infections.54 She has recently begun seeing a new
doctor, Brian Jones. At her first visit, Dr. Jones learns from Ms. Smith that
a few months ago she moved in with her boyfriend and that she has not told
him about her HIV status. Dr. Jones talks to Ms. Smith about the
importance of telling her partner about her status, but she says that she does
not want to tell him because she is afraid of what he will think.
2. Test Case Statutes

a. Michigan's Partner-NotificationStatute
Under Michigan law, all information regarding a patient's HIV status is
confidential, with several exceptions. 56 Among those exceptions is the
requirement for disclosure when there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of
further transmission of HIV from an individual that a physician or health
official knows is HIV-positive.5 7 Moreover, if a physician or health official
knows that an HIV-positive individual has exposed a third party to HIV,
the physician or health official has an affirmative duty to notify that third
party of his or her exposure. When making a disclosure to a third party, a
doctor or health official may not provide any identifying information
regarding the HIV-positive individual to whom the third party has been

53. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 1 (noting regular
adherence to antiretroviral therapy is necessary for effective treatment of HIV).
54. See id. at 2-3 (stating that concurrent infection with other sexually transmitted
infections increases risk of transmission of HIV).
55. Cf Klein, supra note 14, at 8 (observing that in 2006, 80% of Americans
believed individuals with HIV/AIDS faced discrimination, and 40% believed
individuals with HIV/AIDS faced substantial prejudice).
56. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5131(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)
(establishing exceptions to confidentiality including disclosure to local health

department, a patient's sexual partners, and the school board).
57. See id. § 333.5131(5)(b) (allowing the violation of confidentiality rules when
an HIV-positive patient poses a reasonably foreseeable risk of transmission to a known
third party).
58. See id (imposing an affirmative duty upon health care providers to warn

contacts of an HIV-positive patient where there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of
transmission of the virus).
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exposed, unless it is necessary to prevent a reasonably foreseeable risk of
transmission.5 9
No reported cases have addressed the application of section 333.5131
specifically in the context of notification of a sexual partner. 6 0 However,
the Court of Appeals of Michigan upheld the disclosure of a prisoner's HIV
status to a prison guard, in whose face the prisoner spat, on the grounds that
the guard constituted a contact of the prisoner.61
b.

Maryland'sPartner-NotificationStatute

Unlike Michigan, Maryland does not impose an affirmative duty on
physicians or health officials to notify a third party of his or her exposure to
HIV.62 Instead, Maryland law requires that physicians act in good faith
when deciding whether to disclose a patient's HIV status to either the local
health department or the patient's sexual partner. 63 Besides acting in good
faith, a physician must know of a specific contact of an HIV-positive
patient, and the patient must have refused to perform partner notification on
his or her own. 64 When conducting the notification, a doctor may provide
the third party with the HIV-positive individual's identity, as well as the
circumstances giving rise to the notification.65
The only case to apply section 18-337 is Lemon v. Stewart.6 6 The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that section 18-337 does not create
a duty for physicians to notify sexual or needle-sharing partners of an HIVpositive patient.67 By extension, the physicians in the case had no
59. See id § 333.5131(7) (prohibiting the inclusion of identifying information in

any disclosure made to warn a contact of an HIV-positive individual of a potential
exposure).

60. Cf Abouhassan v. Detroit Biomed. Labs., Inc., No. 291294, 2010 WL
3928716, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2010) (allowing the disclosure of a patient's
HIV test result from the laboratory that conducted the test to the doctor who requested
it); People v. Odom, 740 N.W.2d 557, 560-62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming an
inmate's conviction for assault on a prison employee for spitting blood on her).
61. See Odom, 740 N.W. at 565-66 (finding no illegal disclosure of inmate's HIV
status where prison guard was exposed to an inmate's blood, and was therefore a
contact of the inmate).
62. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (LexisNexis 2009) (including no
mention of an affirmative duty to warn third parties of a potential exposure to HIV).
63. See id. HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(b), (e), (f) (providing protection from liability
for any doctor acting in good faith, regardless of whether he or she decides to disclose
or not).
64. See id HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(b) (explaining the circumstances necessary for
a permissible notification to a third party potentially exposed to HIV infection).
65. See id. HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(b)(l)-(2) (enumerating the information that may
be provided when making a disclosure to a third party).
66. See Lemon v. Stewart, 682 A.2d 1177, 1178 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(dismissing complaint alleging negligence on the part of doctors who did not inform
the patient's family of the patient's HIV status).
67. See id at 1184 (finding that liability protections for physicians precluded the
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obligation to notify the patient's family of his positive HIV status. 68
III. ANALYSIS
The personal privacy interest in medical information is not absolute, and
when there is a strong public interest in certain medical information,
limited disclosures may be allowed. 69 The Westinghouse factors articulate
a balancing test that weighs the personal privacy interest at stake against
the government's interest in allowing the disclosure of the medical
information
at issue. 70
A. The PersonalPrivacy Interest in HIV Status Is Great, Regardless of a
Person'sAdherence to Treatment, and Therefore Should Be Strongly
Protectedby the Constitution.
Ms. Smith, as well as all HIV-positive persons, has an extremely great
privacy interest in her HIV status that must be balanced against the
government's interest in disclosure. This privacy interest does not change
simply because of Ms. Smith's regular adherence to treatment. The first
four Westinghouse factors-the type of record involved, the information it
contains, the potential for harm due to nonconsensual disclosure, and the
injury to the relationship that generated the record caused by disclosurespeak to the weight of the privacy interest at issue.7n Taken together and
applied to Ms. Smith's situation, they demonstrate an important and
sensitive privacy interest at stake. Because a privacy interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment does not vary by state, it does not require a
state-specific analysis.72

establishment of an affirmative duty to warn third parties of a patient's HIV status).
68. See id. (arguing that if no duty exists to inform sexual or needle-sharing
partners, no duty can exist to inform family members who are much less likely to
acquire the virus).
69. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (stating that an individual does not have an absolute right to control access to his
or her medical history).
70. See id. at 578 (observing that courts allow intrusion into medical privacy only
when the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest); see also Faison
v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (specifying that protected
information shall be disclosed only after a showing of proper governmental interest).
71. See Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 759 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (W.D. Pa.
1991) (translating the Westinghouse factors into a traditional balancing test).
72. Cf U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (extending included rights to all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States and restricting certain conduct by state
governments).
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1. The Information That Dr.Jones Would Disclose to Ms. Smith's
Boyfriend Is Highly Sensitive and Therefore Necessitates a Highly
ProtectedPrivacyInterest.
The first two Westinghouse factors are the type of record involved in the
disclosure and the information contained in the record.73 Unlike the
records involved in Westinghouse, information related to Ms. Smith's HIV
status is extremely sensitive. 74 Several courts have noted the particular
sensitivity of information related to HIV status.7 5 In large part based on the
behaviors associated with it, an HIV diagnosis may imply sensitive
personal details, in addition to simple medical information.76 Therefore,
HIV-positive individuals have a greater privacy interest in their HIV status
than HIV-negative individuals have in more routine medical information.
While Dr. Jones informing Ms. Smith's boyfriend of her HIV status
would not involve providing access to any particular medical record, it
would involve the disclosure of highly sensitive personal information. 7 7 A
significant portion of the American public continues to associate HIV
infection with high-risk behaviors that are often linked with highly personal
conduct.78 Therefore, disclosure may communicate additional personal
information that falls within the ambit of privacy protections.79

73. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (identifying factors relevant to measuring
privacy interest in specific information).
74. See id. at 579, 580-81 (noting that records contained results of routine testing
not generally regarded as sensitive, but that individual employees may raise a personal
claim of privacy regarding particular information); see also Faison, 823 F. Supp. at
1201-02 (observing that certain kinds of medical information are more sensitive than
others).
75. See Doe v. New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that HIV status
differs from other medical conditions due to the common negative perception of HIVinfected individuals); Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1999) (arguing
that medical information about AIDS is sensitive due to its association with certain
behaviors and the accompanying public stigma).
76. See Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 384 (noting society's moral judgments about
and association of high-risk behaviors with AIDS).
77. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5131 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (LexisNexis 2009) (specifying only that doctors may
perform disclosure under certain circumstances and not how disclosure should be
performed).
78. See Klein, supra note 14, at 8-9 (finding that survey respondents associated

discrimination against HIV-positive persons with discrimination against gays and
lesbians).
79. See Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (stating that
AIDS is closely related to sexual activity).
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2. The Potentialfor Harm ifDr.Jones Discloses Ms. Smith's HIV Status to
Her Boyfriend Is Great, Which Increases the Significance of the Privacy
Interest at Stake.
The third Westinghouse factor is the potential for harm in nonconsensual
disclosure of the information.
If Dr. Jones decides to disclose Ms.
Smith's HIV status to her boyfriend, she is at risk of significant
discrimination and stigma, which is the primary concern of courts
regarding potential harm due to a nonconsensual disclosure of medical
information.
Courts confronted with unauthorized disclosures of
individuals' HIV status have cited the potential for discrimination in all
areas of daily life.82
If Dr. Jones discloses Ms. Smith's HIV status to her boyfriend, Ms.
Smith faces the risk of severe adverse effects in her personal and
professional life. Though the actual amount of discrimination against HIVinfected individuals has decreased as public understanding of the virus has
increased, Ms. Smith and other persons living with HIV continue to face a
significant public stigma. 83 Moreover, the adverse impact of disclosure
may last indefinitely. Because HIV remains incurable, Ms. Smith has no
guarantee that she will be able84poeta
to repair any damage to her reputation or
prevent future discrimination.
Therefore, there is a great potential for
harm if Dr. Jones discloses Ms. Smith's HIV status without her consent.
3. By DisclosingMs. Smith's HIV Status to Her Boyfriend, Dr.Jones May
Greatly Harm Their Doctor-PatientRelationship Because It May Severely
DamageHer Trust in Doctors and DiscourageHerfrom Continuing
Treatment.
The fourth Westinghouse factor is the injury that disclosure may cause to

80. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (explaining that the gravity of potential harm from disclosure increases the
weight of the personal privacy interest in specific medical information).
81. See O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1086 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting
damage to public image and loss of employment as potential results of disclosure of
psychiatric information).
82. Compare Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579 (arguing that the disclosures were
unlikely to have any adverse effects on Westinghouse employees), with Doe v.
Barrington, 729 F. Supp 376, 384-85 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing instances of discrimination
against HIV-positive individuals and their families, including eviction, firing, and
harassment).
83. Cf Klein, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that only 41% of Americans surveyed in
2006 would feel very comfortable working with an HIV-positive person, only 25%
would feel very comfortable living with an HIV-positive person, and only 29% would
feel very comfortable if their child's teacher was HIV-positive).
84. See Doe v. New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasizing the
incurability of HIV).
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the relationship that generated the record. If Dr. Jones chooses to disclose
Ms. Smith's HIV status to her boyfriend, Dr. Jones's and Ms. Smith's
relationship may suffer significant injury and change drastically. 86 While
the third Westinghouse factor is concerned with the harm to the individual
whose medical information is disclosed to a third party, the fourth factor
asks whether the disclosure could damage the relationship in which the
information was originally generated.8 7 For instance, medical records
generated through the employer-employee relationship require a court to
determine whether the employee suffers any economic deprivation or
harassment by the employer due to the disclosure.88
In Ms. Smith's case, the relationship at risk is that between her and Dr.
Though the major motivation to protect sensitive medical
Jones.
information is a person's general privacy interest, doctor-patient
confidentiality also helps doctors to perform their jobs by increasing the
level of trust between doctor and patient.89 If Dr. Jones chooses to disclose
Ms. Smith's HIV status, the loss of trust could damage her future health
care. If Ms. Smith chooses to continue seeing Dr. Jones, she may stop
informing him about aspects of her personal life. 90 Some of these aspects,
such as Ms. Smith's relationship status, can be extremely important for
effective management of not only her HIV care, but also other health care
decisions she might make. 91 At worst, however, Ms. Smith may stop
visiting Dr. Jones altogether. 9 2 Decreasing the regularity of her doctor
visits would hurt Ms. Smith's health by making it more difficult for her to
93
monitor her infection and adherence to treatment.

85. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (listing injury from disclosure to the
relationship that generated the record as a factor to be weighed in evaluating the
personal privacy at stake).
86. Cf Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding no
injury where the relationship between a customer and pharmacy did not change).
87. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (listing "injury from disclosure to the
relationship in which the record was generated" as a factor to be considered, but not
explicitly addressing its application in the present case).
88. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1141 (noting the particular injuries that
may arise in the context of the employer-employee relationship).
89. See Carrie Gene Pottker-Fishel, Improper Bedside Manner: Why State PartnerNotification Laws Are Ineffective in Controllingthe Prolhferation of HIV, 17 HEALTH

147, 174-75 (2007) (noting fears surrounding confidentiality have discouraged
individuals from seeking HIV testing).
90. See id. at 175 (contending that confidentiality concerns may deter patients from
sharing all potentially relevant information with their physicians).

MATRIX

91. See K. E. Kearley et al., An Exploration of the Value of the Personal DoctorPatient Relationship in General Practice,51 BRITISH J. GEN. PRACT. 712, 712 (2001)

(arguing that knowledge of patient's personal life improves a physician's diagnoses).
92. See id. (emphasizing the importance of continuity of care for primary care
physicians).
93. See Pottker-Fishel,supra note 89, at 174 (stating that respecting confidentiality
and preventing the spread of HIV are interrelated goals).
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B. The Government Interest in Allowing Health Care Providers to Disclose
a Person'sHIV Status to ThirdPartiesDiminishes as That Person's
Adherence to Treatment Improves.
The last three Westinghouse factors-the existence of an articulated
public policy supporting the disclosure, the degree of need for access, and
the sufficiency of measures to prevent unauthorized disclosures-facilitate
balancing the government interest in allowing disclosure against the
personal privacy interest of an HIV-infected person. 94 Applying them to
Ms. Smith's case shows how infectiousness affects the weight of the
government interest by decreasing the actual risk of transmission.
Specifically, an analysis of these factors shows that, in a case such as Ms.
Smith's, minimal infectiousness diminishes the government interest so
much that nonconsensual disclosure to a third party is no longer
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 5
1. Ms. Smith's Undetectable Viral Load Means That She Does Not Pose a
Serious PublicHealth Risk, and Therefore May Not Fall Under the Stated
Purpose ofPartner-NotificationLaws.
The fifth Westinghouse factor is whether there is a recognized public
interest militating towards disclosure of the information.9 6 Allowing Dr.
Jones to disclose Ms. Smith's HIV status serves only a broad government
interest in preventing the spread of HIV, and not the specific interest in
warning third parties where there is a significant risk of HIV
transmission.97 Ways of demonstrating recognition of the public interest
include statutory mandates and other articulations of public policy.98
Generally, when a statute requires disclosure to a government agency for a
government program or activity, the court weighs the government's interest
in disclosure against the individual's interest in privacy. 99 When a statute
instead requires disclosure to a non-governmental party, courts look to
94. See Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 759 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (W.D. Pa.
1991) (translating the Westinghouse factors into a traditional balancing test).
95. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 4 (finding significant

reductions in community transmission rates after introduction of antiretroviral
treatment).
96. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (specifying "express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other
recognizable public interest militating towards access" as one factor of the balancing
test).
97. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 5 (describing the high

level of infectiousness of an HIV-positive person with a high viral load).
98. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (stating that courts should look for an
express statutory mandate or articulated public policy).
99. See, e.g., Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting
important government interest in the administration of sentencing and prison policy).
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whether there is an acute public health risk necessitating the disclosure. 0 0
In Ms. Smith's case, this acute public health risk does not exist because of
her low viral load and attendant low level of infectiousness.10 1
a. The Reasonably ForeseeableRisk of TransmissionRequirement
in Michigan'sPartnerNotification Statute Sufficiently Articulates
the Government's Interest in Preventingthe TransmissionofHIV,
and Therefore May Provide a PermissibleStandardfor Dr.Jones
to Disclose Ms. Smith's HIV Status to Her Boyfriend.
Though Michigan's partner-notification statute risks encouraging doctors
to err on the side of notification, even when it is not reasonably necessary
to prevent transmission, by imposing an affirmative duty on doctors, the
statute's foreseeable risk requirement tempers this risk.10 2 Under Michigan
law, a physician has an affirmative duty to disclose a patient's HIV status
when there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of transmission to a third party
whom the patient refuses to warn.10 3 However, the affirmative duty
provides less discretion for health care providers to make a determination
of what course of action will yield the best public health result. 0 4
Moreover, an affirmative duty injects a degree of self-interest into the
doctor's rationale when considering a decision that should focus instead on
the patient and the third party potentially exposed to HIV. 05 If Dr. Jones
focuses on his own liability more than on the well-being of either Ms.
Smith or her boyfriend, then his rationale conflicts with the purpose of the
law, namely to protect third parties from a known risk of HIV-infection.106
However, the requirement of a reasonably foreseeable risk of

100. See Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding that
disclosure of an individual's confidential medical records to a third party did not
advance the government's compelling interest in preventing the transmission of HIV
when the third party would come into only casual contact with that individual).

101. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 4 (noting the effect of
regular antiretroviral treatment on likelihood of transmission).
102. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5131(5)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)
(requiring a reasonably foreseeable risk of transmission for making notification without
the permission of the patient).
103. See id. (specifying when disclosure of a patient's HIV status to a third party is
permissible).

104. See Neidl, supra note 2, at 1215 (noting that New York state's partner
notification law, which imposes an affirmative duty to disclose, "elevates partner
notification to a more aggressive degree than nearly any state in the United States").
105. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Internal Morality of Clinical Medicine: A
Paradigmfor the Ethics of the Helping and Healing Professions, 26 J. MED. &
PHILOSOPHY 559, 576 (2001) (noting that controlling self-interest is essential to
professional practice).

106. See § 333.5131(5)(b) (stating that preventing foreseeable risk of transmission is
the crux of the law).
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transmission actually articulates the primary interest motivating the law. 0 7
It also approximates a consideration of infectiousness and therefore allows
for disclosure primarily in those cases where there is an actual risk.'08
Section 333.5131 of the Michigan Code therefore creates a permissible
standard by which a doctor could decide to make a disclosure because it
limits the application to the specific government interest at stake.109 While
Ms. Smith may not pose a major risk of transmission, the statute does
provide Dr. Jones with discretion to evaluate the actual risk at issue.
Following a consideration of Ms. Smith's level of infectiousness, Dr. Jones
may then decide whether he needs to notify Ms. Smith's boyfriend of his
potential exposure to HIV.
b.

Maryland'sPartnerNotification Statute Does Not Sufficiently
Articulate the Government Interest Because It Does Not
Incorporatea Specific Evaluation of the Risk of Transmission
Before Allowingfor Disclosure.

Section 18-337 of the Maryland Health Code benefits from granting
doctors discretion to determine when partner notification is necessary, but
is vague by failing to explicitly require any consideration of
infectiousness." 0
Maryland's partner-notification statute has only two requirements for
health care providers who decide to disclose a patient's HIV status to a
third party: the patient refuses to notify his or her sexual or needle-sharing
partner, and the doctor acts in good faith in making the decision to
disclose.' '
While the risk of transmission that Ms. Smith poses to her boyfriend is
more significant than the risk she would pose to someone with whom she
only had casual contact, the risk does not rise to the level where Ms. Smith
poses a severe risk of harming her boyfriend because of her undetectable

107. See Stephen P. Clifton et al., HIV-Related Laws in the Michigan Public Health

Code, 73 MICH. B.J. 156, 156 (1994) (determining the focus of HIV-related laws in
Michigan to be on persons at "special risk" for HIV infection).
108. See Efr6n A. Acosta, Comment, The Texas Communicable Disease Prevention
and ControlAct: Are We Offering Enough Protection to Those Who Need It Most?, 36
Hous. L. REV. 1819, 1862-63 n.321 (1999) (describing many state statutes' limitation
of disclosure to specific at-risk individuals (citing MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
333.5131)).
109. See § 333.5131(5)(b) (limiting permissible notifications to where a foreseeable
risk of transmission exists).
110. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (LexisNexis 2009) (incorporating
no evaluation of actual infectiousness into the determination of when partner
notification is permissible).
111. See id. HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(b), (e) (prohibiting disclosure of a patient's
HIV status unless certain requirements are met).
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viral load.1 12 The question then becomes what constitutes a good faith
decision on Dr. Jones's part.1 3 According to the plain meaning of good
faith, Dr. Jones should do what he feels is honest and faithful to his
obligations as a physician.114 Though a good faith standard is an
improvement upon imposing an affirmative duty to disclose in that it
provides for discretion on the part of the doctor, it still does not include an
account of the actual risk of transmission posed.' 15 Therefore, Maryland's
partner-notification law is not sufficiently narrowly tailored and would
allow for notification even when no major risk of transmission exists.
2. Ms. Smith's Undetectable Viral Load Mitigates Her Boyfriend's Need
for Access to Information RegardingHerHIV Status to Effectively Protect
HimselfAgainst Infection Because the Risk of Transmission Is Significantly
Reduced.
The sixth Westinghouse factor is the degree of need for access to the
particular medical information.116 Ms. Smith's boyfriend's general need
for access to information about Ms. Smith's health is substantial due to his
personal interest in protecting his own health."' 7 However, in Ms. Smith's
case, the need for access is not so substantial that it creates a high degree of
necessity for Dr. Jones to provide that information to Ms. Smith's
boyfriend without Ms. Smith's consent.1 18 Determining the degree of need
for access requires an inquiry into whether the interest may be achieved by
means besides disclosure of the specific information.11 9 The fact that Ms.
112. Compare Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding no

compelling government interest where third parties would only come into casual
contact with HIV-infected person), with Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.2d 518, 524 (7th
Cir. 1995) (finding disclosure to an inmate whose HIV-positive cellmate had a
propensity for rape justifiable).
113. See HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(e) (creating good faith requirement in performance
of partner-notification).
114. See id. HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(e), (f) (including no definition of good faith in
the context of partner notification); Bond v. Messerman, 873 A.2d 417, 432 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2005) (stating that when there is no statutory definition, good faith shall be
interpreted by its plain meaning); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (4th pocket ed. 2011)
(defining "good faith" as "honesty in belief or purpose" and "faithfulness to one's duty
or obligation").
115. Cf HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (including no criteria related to actual risk of
transmission).
116. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (holding that the degree of need for access is a necessary factor in weighing the
government interest in disclosure against the personal privacy interest at stake).

117. See R.L. Sowell et al., DisclosureofHIVInfection: How Do Women Decide to

Tell?, 18 HEALTH EDUC. RES. 32, 33 (2003) (describing disclosure of HIV status to
sexual partners as essential to stopping the spread of HIV completely).
118. See Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the high risk
of transmission between cellmates).

119. See Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1995)
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Smith has an undetectable viral load significantly lessens the degree of
need for access because the degree of need for access is linked to, not only
the severity of the potential harm, but also the likelihood of that harm

occurring.120
In Westinghouse, NIOSH could not achieve the objective of a thorough
evaluation of workplace safety without access to employee medical
records. 12 1 In comparison, Ms. Smith's boyfriend has other means
available to protect himself from HIV infection.' 22 Moreover, the
government may also pursue other strategies to protect him and others in a
similar position from HIV infection. 123 Unlike situations where the risk of
transmission is so high that transmission can only be effectively prevented
through disclosure, Ms. Smith's case allows the government to pursue its
public health interests without impinging upon her right to personal
privacy.124 Therefore, the degree of need for access to information about
Ms. Smith's HIV status is not so substantial that it justifies allowing
disclosure without her permission.
a.

While the Reasonably ForeseeableRisk of Transmission
Requirement in the Michigan Statute Limits Disclosures to Where
the Degree of Needfor Access Is Highest, the Affirmative Duty to
Disclose Risks Creates an OverbroadRequirementfor
Disclosure.

Because Michigan's partner-notification statute specifically limits its use
to instances in which there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of transmission,
(finding disclosure of employees' prescription records to employer necessary to
monitor health costs).
120. Cf Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1202-03 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (explaining
that there was a need for access to a prisoner's medical history during her sentencing
because of the likelihood of potential harm that would arise if the information was
withheld).
121. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 576, 579 (finding that access to the entire
medical record is reasonably necessary for NIOSH to effectively monitor workplace
safety).
122. See Condoms and STDs: FactSheet for Public Health Personnel,CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Condoms and STDs: Fact Sheet],
http://www.cdc.gov/condomeffectiveness/latex.htm (advocating use of male condoms
as a highly effective method of preventing the transmission of HIV).
123. See, e.g., Advancing HIV Prevention: New Strategies for a Changing
Epidemic-United States, 2003, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 329
(2003) (describing counseling and awareness programs as ways to improve HIV
prevention).
124. Compare Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the
difficulty of preventing HIV transmission between cellmates without disclosure of
HIV-positive cellmate's status to the HIV-negative cellmate), with Lemon v. Stewart,
682 A.2d 1177, 1184-85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (finding no need to inform the
family members of an HIV-positive man's status due to the low risk of transmission of
HIV to them).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss2/9

20

Wissow: Public Health vs. Privacy: Rebalancing the Government Interest in
2012]

PUBLIC HEALTH VS. PRIVACY

501

it intrinsically identifies those instances where the degree of need for access
will be highest.125 The degree of need for access is directly related to
whether other means exist for accomplishing the government interest at
stake.126 Where the interest is limited to a specific set of circumstances, the
degree of need for access will increase accordingly.127
Under Michigan's partner-notification statute, Dr. Jones's notification of
Ms. Smith's boyfriend may not be permissible because, as stated above,
Ms. Smith may not pose a reasonably foreseeable risk of transmission.128
Such a determination would depend on other facts that Dr. Jones must
obtain from Ms. Smith, including whether she and her boyfriend regularly
use condoms.12 9 Still, Dr. Jones should seek out more facts and avoid
allowing the imposition of an affirmative duty to sway his decision of
whether disclosure is appropriate.130 Therefore, while the Michigan statute
provides a permissible standard in terms of identifying where the degree of
need for access is highest, it may not be applicable to Ms. Smith's case.
b.

Maryland's Good Faith Requirementfor Disclosureof a
Patient'sHIV Status Does Not Establish a High Degree ofNeed
for Access Because It Does Not Adequately Define When
DisclosureIs Necessary.

Section 18-337 of the Maryland Health Code only requires that a doctor
act in good faith when deciding to disclose a patient's HIV status to a
sexual partner that the patient has refused to notify.13 2 As previously
125. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5131(5)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)
(limiting disclosure to cases where there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of
transmission).
126. See, e.g., Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 759 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (W.D.
Pa. 1991) (finding high degree of need for access to teacher's psychiatric records to
reliably determine possible dangers that teachers could pose to students).
127. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3d Cir.
1980) (finding that a review of an entire medical file was the only reasonable way for
NIOSH to compile necessary data).
128. See Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 1 (noting the decreased
risk of sexual transmission of HIV when the HIV-positive partner has an undetectable
viral load).
129. See Condoms and STDs: Fact Sheet, supra note 122, at 2 (describing the high

degree of protection from HIV transmission provided by consistent and correct use of
male condoms).
130. See Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (observing
personal nature of information related to HIV diagnosis that cautions against
disclosure); see also Neidl, supra note 2, at 1212-15 (noting the aggressive nature of
statutes that impose an affirmative duty upon health care providers to disclose a
patient's status to at-risk third parties).
131. See Clifton et al., supra note 107, at 158-59 (stating that one intent of the
original Michigan disclosure provision was to prevent transmission of HIV).
132. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(e) (LexisNexis 2009) (removing
liability for breach of confidentiality for any doctor who performs partner notification

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

21

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9
502

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:2

stated, this standard does not state clearly the government's interest in
allowing for partner notification in all instances that fall under the law.133
The statute also does not establish a high degree of need for third parties,
such as Ms. Smith's boyfriend, to have access to the information. 134 Unlike
the Michigan statute, the Maryland statute does not limit the use of partnernotification to a specific set of circumstances defined by the amount of risk
posed to third parties.1 35
Based on the facts available, Dr. Jones would not be able to make a good
faith determination as to whether to disclose Ms. Smith's status to her
boyfriend.13 6 However, Dr. Jones has all of the information that the statute
requires before he can make a disclosure: whether Ms. Smith has a sexual
partner and whether she refuses to inform him of her HIV status.13 7 While
the Michigan statute at least requires the determination of a foreseeable risk
of transmission, the Maryland statute does not provide any clear impetus
for Dr. Jones to discover more details that would help him evaluate the
actual need for giving Ms. Smith's boyfriend access to information
regarding her HIV status.'3 8 Therefore, Maryland's partner-notification
law allows for disclosure even when a doctor has not even considered in
detail whether an actual risk of transmission exists.
3. Disclosureto Ms. Smith's Boyfriend Would Createa Great Risk to Her
Continued Medical PrivacyBecause There Are No SafeguardsAgainst
FurtherDisclosures.

The final Westinghouse factor is the adequacy of safeguards to prevent

in good faith and in accordance with the rest of the section).
133. See id. (providing no guidance beyond a good faith standard for when to
perform notification).
134. See id. HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (b) (requiring only that a doctor be aware of the
patient's HIV status and the patient's refusal to inform his or her sexual partner for
disclosure to be permissible).
135. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS SERv. § 333.5131(5)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)
(requiring a reasonably foreseeable risk of transmission before a doctor may make a
disclosure of a patient's HIV status), with HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (requiring no
assessment of infectiousness or other risk behaviors that would affect likelihood of
transmission).
136. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 114, at 337 (maintaining that good
faith requires acting with faithfulness to one's duty or obligation); Condoms andSTDs:
Fact Sheet, supra note 122, at 2 (explaining the vast difference in rates of transmission

between heterosexual couples who use condoms during sexual intercourse and those
who do not).
137. See HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(b) (limiting the requirements for permissible

disclosure to instances where the doctor is aware of an HIV-positive patient's sexual
partner and the patient has refused to perform notification independently).
138. See id. (imposing no specific requirement that doctors investigate factors
contributing to actual risk of transmission from patient to patient's sexual partner).
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unauthorized disclosure.' 3 9 Because no partner-notification law addresses
what a third party may do with the information once warned about a sexual
partner's HIV status, Ms. Smith's boyfriend may share the fact of Ms.
Smith's HIV status with whomever he wishes. 140 These safeguards are
crucial after the initial disclosure is made to ensure that the information is
used only for the stated purpose of the law requiring the disclosure.141 The
lack of safeguards in partner-notification laws poses a major risk to Ms.
Smith's medical privacy, and also highlights the primary issues
surrounding HIV infection that make Ms. Smith's privacy interest in
information regarding her HIV status so strong.142
While partner-notification laws may not be able to control the
independent conduct of third parties, other precautions may be taken to
limit the likelihood of further disclosures and violations of a patient's
medical privacy.14 3 These precautions may, in certain instances, balance
the need for disclosure to protect a third party from likely infection against
the privacy interest of the HIV-positive person.144 However, in Ms.
Smith's case, more than simple precautions may be warranted.
a.

The Michigan Statute Does Not Have Adequate Safeguards to
Prevent UnnecessaryDisclosuresBecause It Does Not Speak to
the ThirdParty's Conduct Once the Initial DisclosureIs Made.

Michigan's partner-notification statute does not address what a partner
may do with the information regarding the potential HIV exposure after
being notified.14 5 Therefore, if Dr. Jones decides to notify Ms. Smith's
139. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (holding that adequate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure are an
important factor in judging the constitutionality of a particular law requiring disclosure
of personal medical information).
140. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5131 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (imposing
no duty upon the sexual partner of an HIV-positive person to keep that person's HIV
status confidential); HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (declining to address what a third party
may do with information regarding a sexual partner's HIV status after being notified).
141. Cf Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (expressing concern about
unwarranted use of personal information gathered by government); see also
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 580 (finding that NIOSH would only disclose Westinghouse
employee medical information to third parties when necessary for process of analysis).
142. See, e.g., Doe v. New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a
positive HIV status carries an additional public stigma that does not accompany other
medical diagnoses).
143. See § 333.5131(7) (prohibiting providing identifying information of an HIVpositive person when making a disclosure unless necessary to prevent a foreseeable risk
of transmission).
144. See Pottker-Fishel, supra note 89, at 174, 176 (arguing that statutes like
Texas's partner-notification statute are exemplary because they prohibit the inclusion
of identifying information as well as any information regarding the time period in
which the partner was exposed).
145. See § 333.5131 (declining to address what should happen after disclosure
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boyfriend of his potential exposure to HIV, Ms. Smith's personal
information regarding her HIV status may be disclosed further without her
consent.146 Such a lack of protections for sensitive personal information
goes against the principle that a law may require disclosure only in limited
circumstances that serve a legitimate government interest.147
However, section 333.5131 of the Michigan code protects the privacy of
HIV-positive persons to a certain extent by prohibiting a doctor or health
official from including identifying information while making a
disclosure.14 8 The only exception is where identifying information is
necessary to prevent a foreseeable risk of transmission of HIV.149 While
this is an important safeguard for Ms. Smith's privacy, its effectiveness
may be undermined by the fact that she is in a monogamous relationship,
making the source of the potential exposure more obvious to her
boyfriend. 50 If Ms. Smith's boyfriend then decides to share his knowledge
of Ms. Smith's HIV status with someone else, he will be using the
information in a way not envisioned by the purpose of the law, which was
only to protect him.15
b.

The MarylandStatute Has Inadequate Safeguards to Prevent
UnnecessaryDisclosuresBecause It Does Not Speak to the Third
Party's Conduct Once the InitialDisclosureIs Made and Also
Increases the DangerofFurtherDisclosuresby Allowing Ms.
Smith's Doctor to Disclose Her Identifying Information in
Addition to the PotentialExposure.

Maryland's partner-notification statute does not help to limit the
potential for further disclosures without Ms. Smith's consent, and therefore
occurs).
146. See id. (including no provision regarding the conduct of a sexual partner who is
notified of a patient's HIV status pursuant to the statute); see also MICH. CoMP. LAWS
SERV. § 333.5114a (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (describing requirements for partnernotification but including no guidance on respecting confidentiality of sources of
potential HIV exposure).
147. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-78 (3d Cir.
1980) (stressing that any disclosures should be warranted by a societal interest in
disclosure that outweighs the individual's privacy interest).
148. See § 333.5131(7) (prohibiting inclusion of any identifying information during
the partner-notification process except in certain circumstances).
149. See id (allowing inclusion of identifying information only when necessary to
prevent foreseeable risk of HIV transmission).

150. Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding

to the Resurgence ofAggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 111, 169 (1994) (finding that notification of an exclusive sexual partner
may result in constructive notification of the HIV-positive person's identity).
151. See § 333.5131(5)(b) (specifying that partner-notification without a patient's
consent is permissible where there is a foreseeable risk of transmission of HIV to a
third party who is unaware of that risk).
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is not sufficient to protect her privacy beyond the disclosure necessary to
achieve the purpose of the law.' 52 Section 18-337 of the Maryland Health
Code lacks even the basic protection of Michigan's statute because it does
not impose any limitations on the ability of a doctor or health care official
to share identifying information when making a disclosure to warn a third
party. 153 While this risk of further disclosure may be warranted in cases
where an HIV-positive person is highly infectious and engaging in highrisk behavior, Ms. Smith does not pose so much danger that such a risk
should be taken without her consent.15 4
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION

The foregoing analysis highlights several deficiencies in current partnernotification laws, making them ill-suited for dealing with the new realities
of HIV treatment. 15 In particular, the lack of accounting for infectiousness
in many partner-notification statutes creates an overbroad standard that
allows for violations of personal privacy even where the government
interest will not be substantively promoted. 5 6 The reality of HIV today,
when a person regularly adheres to treatment and maintains an undetectable
viral load, is vastly different from the highly dangerous levels of
infectiousness that typified the virus in the past that made drawing
comparisons to Tarasoffs mentally unstable murderer much simpler for
lawmakers. 57 By taking account of infectiousness when establishing
requirements for permissible notification, partner-notification statutes will
better balance the government interest in preventing the reckless
transmission of HIV with the privacy interests of persons infected with
HIV.15 8
152. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §

18-337 (LexisNexis 2009) (lacking a

provision governing the conduct of a third party notified pursuant to the statute).
153. See id HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(b)(1) (permitting a doctor or health official
performing partner notification to include the HIV-positive individual's identity when
making the disclosure).

154. See, e.g., Effect ofAntiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at 1, 4 (stating that the

risk of transmission is reduced when the HIV-positive partner has an undetectable viral
load and that effective antiretroviral treatment reduces sexual transmission of HIV).
155. See supra Part III.B (describing ways in which the government interest in
partner notification weakens in the case of HIV-positive patients adhering to treatment
and maintaining an undetectable viral load).
156. See supra Part III.B.1 (finding that HIV-positive patients like Ms. Smith do not
clearly fall into the area of government interest described by partner-notification laws).
157. Compare Stenger, supra note 18, at 494 (observing the particular deadliness of
AIDS as instrumental in motivating legislatures to pass partner-notification laws), with
Effect of AntiretroviralTherapy, supra note 5, at 4 (noting the demonstrated decreased

rates of transmission related to effective antiretroviral treatment).
158. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir.
1980) (holding that disclosure must serve specific interest); see also, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 333.5131(5)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (balancing governmental
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Michigan's partner-notification law provides an excellent starting point
upon which to build a new infectiousness standard. 159 The reasonably
foreseeable risk of transmission requirement not only gives doctors and
health officials discretion as to when to make a notification without a
patient's consent, but also emphasizes the actual purpose of the law, which
is to reduce the risk of transmission. 16 0 Conversely, Maryland's good faith
standard, while providing discretion, gives less specification as to when it
will be most important to perform notification without a patient's

consent. 16 1
Still, Michigan does not provide the perfect example because it imposes
an affirmative duty on doctors to warn a third party of potential HIV
exposure.162 The unpopularity of such a provision is demonstrated by the
number of states that do not include it, as well as the many states that
provide specifically that their partner-notification statutes shall not be
interpreted to create an affirmative duty to notify.16 1
V. CONCLUSION

The governmental role in encouraging disclosure of HIV status, while
still great, diminishes as HIV treatment continues to develop and allow
HIV-positive persons to reduce their risk of transmission.164 If partnernotification statutes include an evaluation of infectiousness, they will be
more narrowly tailored to the government's interest in preventing the
further spread of HIV while also giving more respect to the personal
privacy interest of HIV-positive persons.

interest in HIV prevention with patient privacy by requiring a reasonably foreseeable
risk of transmission for disclosure); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir.
1995) (allowing disclosure of HIV status due to the high likelihood of transmission).
159. See § 333.5131(5)(b) (describing requirements for permissible partnernotification).
160. See id. (establishing a foreseeable risk of transmission as the primary
requirement for permissible partner notification without giving a specific definition of
foreseeable risk).
161. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337(e) (LexisNexis 2009) (providing
a good faith standard for partner notification but providing no further guidance).
162. See § 333.5131(5)(b) (creating an affirmative duty to warn known sexual
partners of an HIV-positive patient who are unaware of the person's HIV status); supra
Part III.B.1.a (explaining why affirmative duty statutes can undermine the best public
health result).
163. See When, If Ever, Can You Divulge Your ED Patient's HIV Status?, ED
(AHC Media, Atlanta, Ga.), Oct. 1, 2008, at 119, available at

LEGAL LETTER

http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/Eiseleinpatient HIV status.pdf (stating that
only a few states require doctors to disclose HIV status to sexual partners and that
Michigan is therefore in the minority).
164. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980); Effect of Antiretroviral Therapy, supra note 5, at I (describing the change in
rates of transmission related to the development of antiretroviral therapies).
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